Game Theory
Econ 3208
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Self Test
Finding Nash Equilibria
Player 2
X
Y
Player 1
A
10
,
10
15
,
5
B
5
,
15
12
,
12
Question 1.
What is Player 1's best reply to Player 2 playing Y?
none
A
B
both A and B
Question 2.
What is the equilibrium of the above game?
{A,X}
{B,X}
{A,Y}
{B,Y}
Question 3.
Is {B,X} an equilibrium of the above game?
Yes
No, player 1 would deviate
No, player 2 would deviate
No, both players would deviate
Question 4.
Player 2
X
Y
Z
Player 1
A
5
,
5
1
,
1
4
,
8
B
2
,
0
2
,
6
5
,
5
What are the equilibria of the above game?
{A,X} only
{A,X} and {B,Z}
{B,Y} only
{A,Z} only
Question 5.
Player 2
X
Y
Z
Player 1
A
6
,
6
8
,
20
0
,
8
B
10
,
0
5
,
5
2
,
8
C
8
,
0
20
,
0
4
,
4
What is the equilibrium of the above game?
{B,Y}
{C,Z}
{A,X}
{A,Y}
Player 2
L
R
Player 1
A
3
,
20
1
,
10
D
2
,
10
0
,
30
Question 6.
How many equilibria does this game have?
0
1
2
3
Question 7.
For Player 1, what is true about strategy A?
A is strictly dominant but not weakly dominant
A is weakly dominant but not strictly dominant
A is both strictly and weakly dominant
A is not dominant
Gilmour
Lapse
Echoes
Bell
Waters
Wall
40
,
8
30
,
6
50
,
1
Moon
30
,
6
20
,
9
50
,
1
Wish
20
,
5
40
,
2
50
,
0
Question 8.
Does either player have a strictly dominant strategy?
Waters only
Gilmour only
Both Waters and Gilmour
Neither Waters nor Gilmour
Question 9.
Does either player have a weakly dominant strategy?
Waters only
Gilmour only
Both Waters and Gilmour
Neither Waters nor Gilmour
Question 10.
Does either player have a strictly dominated strategy?
Waters only
Gilmour only
Both Waters and Gilmour
Neither Waters nor Gilmour
Question 11.
Does either player have a weakly dominated strategy?
Waters only
Gilmour only
Both Waters and Gilmour
Neither Waters nor Gilmour
Question 12.
Player 2
X
Y
Player 1
A
0
,
0
0
,
1
B
2
,
0
0
,
0
What are the equilibria of the above game?
{B,X} only
{A,Y} and {B,X}
{A,Y}, {B,X}, and {B,Y}
none
Question 13.
Barney
Left
Right
Fred
Up
10
,
10
0
,
10
Down
10
,
0
10
,
10
What are the equilibria of the above game?
{Up,Left} only
{Down,Right} only
{Up,Left} and {Down,Right}
{10,10}