Research

My sundry research interests span behavioral & experimental investigations into decision making and fairness; theoretical analysis of antitrust & competition economics, including the effects of mergers in common-value auction markets; and applications of industrial organization, often to business disciplines such as accounting, operations, and marketing.

Below is a grouping of research by the themes linked above, or you can see my entire list of publications.

Decisions & Choice Overload

Having more options is not necessarily better...

Why do individuals often make poor choices when faced with complex decisions involving many options (such as the selection of health care insurance or retirement plan savings options) and what can be done to improve individuals' decision-making performance? In a series of experiments, we identify the decision-making rules that individuals use when selecting among lotteries and how those rules change with the size of the choice set. Further, we examine how demographics (like age) impact choice overload. Several choice architectures to help with information overload are studied.

A related strand of research examines how decisions vary with response modes, or ways of asking individuals to express their preferences. For example, we show that the famous Allais common ratio paradox only manifests in traditional choice environments, and not when subjects evaluate options using subjective happiness or willingness to pay metrics.

Publications & Working Papers

Grants

Fairness & Procedural Justice

It's not what we get, it's how we get it

People care about fairness. That extends not only to receiving fair rewards but also to being treated fairly.

My earlier research examined the role of fairness in the context of online coupon codes and cautioned firms not to make the existence of such codes salient to those who do not have discounts. Another experiment shows that subjects value fair procedures and are willing to pay for them.

Publications & Working Papers

Antitrust & Collusion

Together forever and never to part

While collusion in traditional price-setting markets is unambiguosly bad for consumers, holding all else constant, collusion or mergers in common-value auctions provide bidders with more information and therefore encourage higher bids. In this research, we examine when collusion may actually be beneficial for the auctioneer and how collusion can be detected.

Related research examines more general areas of antitrust, including how accounting policies can inadvertently help firms collude and the role of behavioral economics in antitrust enforcement.

Publications & Working Papers

Industrial Organization

Business is a game. The greatest game on earth if you learn how to play it.

Applications of industrial organization and game theory to a number of (often business) disciplines.

Publications & Working Papers